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INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW 
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AMENABILITY OF INDIAN DOMESTIC 
SPORTS GOVERNING BODIES TO JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 
 
SATCHIT BHOGLE* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Sports governing bodies wield enormous power, not only over the rights 
and interests of athletes and players, but also over the sports loving public.  It is 
therefore essential that sports governing bodies exercise their power fairly.  At 
the same time, sport demands that its governing bodies be allowed to make  
decisions autonomously and quickly, while also keeping in mind the particular 
requirements of each sport.  Therefore, it must be asked whether, for the  
effective governance of sport, which includes the balancing of the interests of 
all stakeholders, including players, spectators, and investors (including sponsors 
and commercial rights holders), the decisions of sports bodies should be subject 
to judicial review.  Some authors have begun with the hypothesis that a body, 
which governs a sport, even as the de facto governing body, ought to be one 
against which fundamental rights are enforceable.1  However, this article does 
not take such a normative position. 
This article will examine first, the source of courts’ power over sporting 
bodies, specifically the courts’ justification for holding that sports governing 
bodies are amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Indian  
Constitution; second, the scope of judicial review over the decisions of sporting 
bodies; third, the applicability of judicial review in cases where the sport has 
more than one sporting body; fourth, the possibility of judicial review of the 
decisions of private clubs and leagues; and fifth, possible solutions for ensuring 
a fair yet efficient sports dispute settlement mechanism, namely, the creation of 
a dedicated arbitral or judicial tribunal and the improvement of the existing  
system of judicial review. 
                                                          
1. Aditya Sondhi, The Legal Status of BCCI: Unwarranted Ad-Hocism, Constitutional Hurdles and 
the Pressing Need for a Cricket-Legislation, 22 NAT’L L. SCH. INDIA REV. 111, 113 (2010). 
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This article will focus primarily on team sports.  It will also presume that 
all disputes are domestic in nature, i.e., the athlete and the sporting body are 
both Indian entities. 
II. THE SOURCE OF COURTS’ POWER OVER SPORTING BODIES 
Sporting bodies are usually established as private bodies, whether as  
societies or as companies, with their relations with individuals and other bodies 
being contractual in nature.  Public remedies such as writs, however, can only 
be sought against public bodies, and in India, fundamental rights—crucially, the 
right to freedom of trade and occupation and the right to fair, non-arbitrary, and 
non-discriminatory application of law—may be enforced only against bodies 
that qualify as “State” under Article 12 of the Indian Constitution.2  Hence, if 
one were seeking public remedies against a sporting body, one would have to 
convince a court that the sporting body was functionally or structurally an  
“instrumentality of the State.” 
In England, which does not have a constitution that defines what structurally 
comprises the State, attempts have been made to persuade courts that sporting 
bodies carry out “public functions.”  The prima facie rule, as laid down in Ex 
parte Flint Town United Football Club, is that no writ of certiorari may be  
issued against domestic tribunals since their authority derives solely from  
contract.3   Therefore, public law was sought to be invoked through the  
application of the public policy doctrine.  In Nagle v. Feilden, the appellant 
sought a license from the Jockey Club (Club) to train horses, and thus was not 
herself a member of the Club.4  It was contended that in the absence of a contract 
between the appellant and the Club, restraint of trade as a violation of public 
policy could not be invoked.5  However, Lord Denning M.R. agreed that having 
a duty to act fairly would be the case when dealing with a social club, an  
association which had a practical monopoly in the field of horse racing, and 
whose actions affected an individual’s right to work. 
The decision of the Court of Appeal (CA) in Ex parte Aga Khan,6 however, 
seemed to disavow the rationale in Nagle.  In the absence of an authoritative 
decision by the House of Lords, the CA held that while the functions of the Club 
may be described as public, they were not governmental.  The CA conceded, 
like in Nagle, that the Club was practically a monopolist, and that a statutory 
                                                          
2. See M. P. Singh, Fundamental Rights, State Action and Cricket in India, 13 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 
203, 209 (2005). 
3. R v. Football Ass’n of Wales ex parte Flint Town United Football Club, [1991] QB 44 (Eng.). 
4. Nagle v. Feilden [1966] 2 QB 633, 635 (Eng.). 
5. Id. at 644. 
6. R v. Disciplinary Comm. of the Jockey Club ex parte Aga Khan [1993] 1 WLR 909, 923 (Eng.). 
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body in place of the Club would have approximately the same rules, but this did 
not change the fact that the Club was a private body, against whom only  
remedies in contract could be sought.  The CA, however, did not preclude the 
possibility of judicial review against the decisions of the Club, and stated that, 
as in Nagle, where a petitioner has no contractual relationship with the Club, the 
absence of any other remedy could be significant.  Hoffman L.J. held that while 
the Club had considerable power over an important economic activity, and even 
if it exercised public functions, it was a private body.  Citing Ex parte Datafin,7 
he recognised the principle that the absence of a formal public source of power 
was not conclusive.  Yet, he decided that the Panel’s functions were  
governmental, while the Club’s functions were not.  Thus, regulation of sports 
was not seen as governmental.  
 However, in India, the courts are not restricted by the rules governing  
prerogative writs in England.8  Therefore, while a series of cases, from  
Rajasthan Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal9 to Hasia v. Sehravardi,10 evolved 
tests for a body to be considered an “instrumentality of the State,” both  
structural, such as the character of the body as statutory or non-statutory, the 
degree of control by the State over the body either by funding or by the presence 
of State agents within the governing structure of the body, etc., and functional, 
such as the public nature of the functions carried out by the body and the  
enjoyment of the body of a State-conferred or State-protected monopoly, the 
Supreme Court (SC) eventually favoured only the structural tests and stated that 
for a body to be an instrumentality of the State, it must be “financially,  
functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the  
Government.”11 
However, sporting bodies are not like electricity distribution boards (as in 
Mohan Lal) or like colleges (as in Hasia).  The market for organisation of team 
sports is a natural monopoly, because as long as sports governing bodies  
demand exclusivity from its players, the best players will not compete (and 
thereby produce the best product) without being brought under a single  
governing body.12  This monopoly exists equally at every level of the pyramidal 
                                                          
7. See, e.g., R v. Panel on Takeovers & Mergers ex parte Datafin [1987] QB 815, 820 (Eng.). 
8. See, e.g., Shyam v. Nath, (2015) 5 SCC 423, ¶ 10 (India); Nath v. Income-Tax Officer, (1965) 3 
SCR 536, ¶ 6 (India); Mehra v. Union of India, (2004) DLT 114 (Del. HC) 323, ¶ 13. 
9. (1967) 3 SCR 377 (India). 
10. (1981) 2 SCR 79 (India). 
11. Biswas v. Indian Inst. of Chem. Biology, (2002) 5 SCC 111, ¶ 40 (India). 
12. The problems of audiences not being able see the best players compete with another as a result 
of there not being a single board may be seen in boxing, where four major associations, the World 
Boxing Association, the International Boxing Federation, the World Boxing Council, and the World 
Boxing Organization, compete to sanction professional bouts, and where there is a schism between 
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structure of sports, and even at the state or district level, it is desirable that there 
be only one sports governing body.  However, as the sole buyer of athletes’ and 
players’ services and the sole supplier of sporting products (for professional 
matches), sports governing bodies have tremendous power to affect the rights 
and interests of both athletes and the viewing public.  In Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. 
Union of India, the SC had the opportunity to seriously examine the question of 
whether a sports governing body was “the State,” in the context of the Board of 
Control for Cricket in India (B.C.C.I.).13  The B.C.C.I. is a private body  
established as a society, but has historically selected a team that plays as and is 
universally recognised as the Indian cricket team.  Its members are various  
bodies for the organisation of cricket at the state level as well as certain clubs 
and regional associations—all private—and between them, they contract with 
all the recognised top level players in the country.  The SC observed that the 
B.C.C.I. enjoyed monopolist status in the market for the organisation of  
professional cricket matches even though the State did not confer or protect such 
status.14  Nevertheless, the SC held that the B.C.C.I. did not meet the structural 
tests to be considered State. 
However, the SC did not close the door on judicial review of the decisions 
of sports governing bodies.  In the same year as Zee Telefilms Ltd., the Queen’s 
Bench Division in R v. Appeal Board of the Jockey Club upheld the decision in 
Aga Khan.15  The court denied that the increase in the popularity and importance 
of sport in the years between the decisions, as claimed by the petitioner, had any 
impact on the nature of the functions carried out by the body.16  The court  
likened sport to religion, in that the government encouraged it, but did not  
actively interfere in it.  The court also rejected the notion that government  
funding was the deciding factor in determining whether a body’s functions were 
public.17  However, in India, when sport (generally cricket) has been compared 
to religion, it has very different implications.  Sport, like religion, is a sphere 
which the State is formally absent from, and yet one in which the State takes 
enormous interest.  Keeping this in mind, the SC concluded that while the 
B.C.C.I. is not State, and therefore fundamental rights are not enforceable under 
Article 32 against it, it nevertheless carried out public functions (as opposed to 
the term “governmental functions” used in Aga Khan), and hence, could be 
                                                          
professional and amateur boxing, though it may be argued there that the two are actually different 
sports. 
13. AIR 2005 SC 2677 (India). 
14. Id. 
15. [2005] EWHC (Admin) 2197, ¶¶ 44–45 (Eng.). 
16. Id. at ¶ 31. 
17. Id. at ¶ 35. 
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made subject to judicial review under Article 226.18 
III. THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER THE DECISIONS OF 
SPORTING BODIES 
Article 226 empowers High Courts to issue writs “in the nature of” the  
prerogative writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and 
certiorari not only against the State, but to “any person or authority” for the 
enforcement of fundamental rights and for “any other purpose.”  In Shri Anandi 
Mukata Satguru (S.J.M.S. Trust) v. Rudani, it was held that “any person or  
authority” under Article 226 is not confined only to statutory authorities and 
instrumentalities of the State, but may cover any other person or body  
performing public duties.19  Further, the court need not only issue a writ, but 
may also make an order or direct a person or authority as it considers  
appropriate.20  Article 226 therefore gives the courts enormous power over 
sporting bodies.  Article 32 of the Indian Constitution similarly empowers the 
SC to issue the same writs, though only for the enforcement of fundamental 
rights. 
Generally, the courts have professed to maintain a deferential approach to 
specialised bodies.  The SC has held that the courts should refrain from  
interfering in the decision of an expert body, tribunal, or a specially constituted 
body.21  The SC lacks the competence to make decisions in specialised areas, as 
well as in such specialised bodies.  These could also be in the nature of a  
sporting body,22 whether in the making of decisions purely related to sport, such 
as team selection, or the making of business decisions related to the operations 
of the sport.  However, it has been held that any authority that “decides”  
anything has a duty to act fairly.23  To decide fairly is to consider rational factors, 
avoid irrational factors, and act in a non-discriminatory and non-arbitrary  
fashion. 
If we turn once again to the B.C.C.I., we can see that the procedure for 
conducting enquiries into an alleged breach of the B.C.C.I. Rules and  
                                                          
18. See Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Cricket Ass’n of Bihar, (2015) 3 SCC 251 (India); Zee 
Telefilms Ltd., AIR 2005 SC at ¶ 34. See also Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Netaji Cricket Club, 
(2005) 4 SCC 741, ¶¶ 80–81 (India). 
19. Shri Anandi Mukata Satguru (S.J.M.S. Trust) v. Rudani, (1989) 2 SCR 697 (India). 
20. See Irani v. State of Madras, (1962) 2 SCR 169 (India); Kochunni v. State of Madras, AIR 1959 
SC 725 (India). 
21. See Verma v. Union of India, (1994) 1 SCR 700 (India); Clariant Int’l Ltd. v. Sec. & Exch. Bd. 
of India, AIR 2004 SC 4236 (India). 
22. JUSTICE MUKUL MUDGAL, LAW & SPORTS IN INDIA: DEVELOPMENTS, ISSUES AND 
CHALLENGES 309 (2011). 
23. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262 (India). 
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Regulations meets the principles of natural justice by providing parties with a 
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to be represented by a lawyer.24   
Nevertheless, the Court in Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Cricket Ass’n 
of Bihar (B.C.C.I. v. C.A.B.) heard petitions for the investigation into allegations 
of illegal betting and spot fixing25 in the Indian Premier League (I.P.L.)  
(organised by the B.C.C.I.) and appointed its own panel over the independent 
panel constituted by the B.C.C.I., comprised of retired judges of the Madras 
High Court.26  Fixing of cricket matches or any part thereof is not an offence 
under any law in India.  Legally speaking, spot fixing, notwithstanding that it 
hurt sports fans and the game generally, amounted only to a breach of the 
B.C.C.I. Anti-Corruption Code, the Code of Conduct for Players and Team  
Officials, the I.P.L. Operational Rules, and the franchise agreement between the 
I.P.L. and team owners—all private contracts between the B.C.C.I. and other 
private parties.  The SC thus usurped the power of the B.C.C.I. to investigate 
alleged violations and to impose penalties against persons who had breached 
obligations under these contracts.  Though one of the team owners investigated 
was the son-in-law of the B.C.C.I. President, who was also a director of the 
company that owned the team, the said President had stepped aside voluntarily 
and could not exercise his powers by court order.27  Further, members of the 
panel created by the B.C.C.I. were independent of the B.C.C.I. and were  
respected former judges of a High Court (as a disciplinary proceeding, and as 
per agreement between the parties,28 the B.C.C.I. was entitled to appoint the 
members of the panel).  The panelists were paid by the B.C.C.I., but did not 
stand to gain from any recommendations made; the members of the SC’s own 
panel were also paid by the B.C.C.I.  Finally, neither panel was governed by 
formal rules of evidence and criminal procedure, but only by the principles of 
natural justice.  It is difficult to see then what permitted the SC to sit in review 
                                                          
24. See BD. OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA, MEMORANDUM AND RULES AND REGULATIONS 
4849 (2012) https://relaunch-live.s3.amazonaws.com/cms/documents/BCCI%20Rules%20and%20 
Regulations.pdf [hereinafter B.C.C.I. RULES AND REGULATIONS]. 
25. Spot fixing involves the prearranging of a specific part of a match, rather than the outcome of 
the match itself. In the game of cricket, successful and unsuccessful attempts have been made to fix the 
outcome of a single ball, e.g., that the bowler will bowl a “wide” or a “no ball”—essentially an invalid 
delivery—or to fix the number of runs scored off a single over, i.e. a set of six balls which a single 
bowler may bowl consecutively. 
26. Petition for Special Leave to Appeal, Cricket Ass’n of Bihar v. Bd. of Control for Cricket in 
India, No. 26633/2013, (Oct. 8, 2013) (India). 
27. Petition for Special Leave, Cricket Ass’n of Bihar v. Bd. of Control for Cricket in India, No. 
26633/2013, (Sept. 27, 2013) (India). 
28. Indian Premier League, Anti Corruption Policy, IPLT20, http://www.iplt20.com 
/about/2016/anti-corruption-policy (last visited Dec. 15, 2016); Indian Premier League, Code of  
Conduct for Players and Team Officials, IPLT20, http://www.iplt20.com/about/2016/code-of-conduct-
for-players-and-team-officials/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2016). 
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of the proceedings.  The SC’s panel thereafter exceeded its terms of reference 
to make observations drawing attention to a clandestine amendment to the 
B.C.C.I. Rules, allowing B.C.C.I. administrators to own teams in the league and 
thereby create a conflict of interest.  The SC, while it refused to hold the  
amendment per se illegal, struck it down on grounds that the B.C.C.I. was  
performing public functions, which could be performed only in accordance with 
the principles of natural justice.  Natural justice is a component of Article 14 of 
the Indian Constitution, but the SC in B.C.C.I. v. C.A.B. held that Article 14 was 
not the sole repository of natural justice in the Indian Constitution. In this  
manner, the SC surreptitiously made a fundamental right enforceable against 
the B.C.C.I.  It also constituted a committee to make recommendations on 
amendments to the B.C.C.I. Rules, whose expenses are borne by the B.C.C.I.  
These have included sweeping changes such as the ineligibility of ministers and 
government servants from holding positions on the Apex Council of the 
B.C.C.I., never mind their experience in public administration.29  Despite being  
recommendations, the SC has strongly hinted that it will enforce them against 
the BCCI.30  Even if they are not made mandatory, given the enormous influence 
that even the SC’s recommendations have, such rulings could act as coercion 
against sporting bodies by legitimising public outcry. 
The SC in B.C.C.I. v. C.A.B. also assayed the amendment on the anvil of 
public policy.  It held that any deviation from or abrogation of the principles of 
“justice, fairness, good conscience, equity and objectivity,” i.e., the  
“fundamental principles of law,”31 would be opposed to public policy.32   
However, while it appears that public policy is the same as natural justice,  
natural justice cannot be abrogated by the legislature, while public policy is a 
                                                          
29. SUPREME COURT COMM., PART TWO: REPORT ON CRICKET REFORMS – SUPREME COURT 
COMMITTEE ON REFORMS IN CRICKET 81 (2016), https://lodhacommittee.wordpress.com/2016/01 
/04/report-on-cricket-reforms/ (follow “FINAL REPORT – VOLUME 1”). The Committee has  
expressed a preference for former players running the administration of sport, which is a preference 
shared by judges. During a period when the President of the B.C.C.I. was under investigation, the Court 
appointed a retired former captain of the Indian cricket team as the interim commissioner of the IPL. 
The appointee’s experience and qualifications in sports administration, if they were considered, were 
not recorded. See Petition for Special Leave, Bd. of Control for Cricket v. Cricket Ass’n of Bihar, No. 
26633/2013, (Mar. 28, 2014) (India). 
30. See Supreme Court Tells BCCI: Fall in Line, Lodha Panel Report Deserves Respect, INDIAN 
EXPRESS, indianexpress.com/article/sports/cricket/supreme-court-gets-stern-with-bcci-asks-it-to-im-
plement-lodha-panel-recommendations (last updated Feb. 5, 2016) (quoting the Court as saying, “The 
best thing is to fall in line and follow the suggestions to save the trouble”); Utkarsh Anand, Supreme 
Court ‘Inclined to Implement’ All Recommendations by Lodha Panel, INDIAN EXPRESS, http://indian-
express.com/article/sports/cricket/sc-pulls-up-bcci-again-says-it-is-practically-corrupting-its-units 
(last updated Apr. 6, 2016) (quoting the Court as saying that it will be “inclined to implement all its 
recommendations”). 
31. See, e.g., Oil & Nat. Gas Corp. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705 (India). 
32. Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Cricket Ass’n of Bihar, (2015) ¶ 90 (India). 
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creature of the legislature and executive.33  The Arbitration and Conciliation 
(Amendment) Act, 2015 has been passed and has sought to implement the  
recommendations of the 246th Law Commission Report (Law Commission) 
with the scope of “public policy” as a ground for setting aside an arbitral award 
under Section 34.34  In Renusagar Power Plant Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 
the SC held that an award would be contrary to public policy if such  
enforcement would be contrary to “(i) fundamental policy of Indian law; or (ii) 
the interests of India; or (iii) justice or morality.”35  The Law Commission  
recommended that these be restricted to “[(i)] fundamental policy of Indian law; 
or . . . [(ii)] most basic notions of morality or justice.”36  Since the courts regard 
the decisions of sporting bodies with a similar deference as they do arbitral 
awards, it needs to be asked whether such a restriction on the scope would affect 
the scope of judicial review of the decisions of sporting bodies.  This is an  
especially difficult question, given that the SC did not clarify the distinction 
between “fundamental policy of Indian law” (which will remain unamended 
following the passing of the amendment) and “morality and justice” (which will 
be amended).  It does not seem that the manner in which the B.C.C.I. acted was 
contrary to the “fundamental policy of Indian law” or the “most basic notions 
of morality or justice.” 
The natural question that arises is whether matters of team selection would 
be subject to judicial review.  It was argued that such inclusion would not allow 
selectors the discretion to choose players on admittedly subjective criteria,37 and 
that allowing such challenges would open the floodgates of litigation and not 
allow sporting bodies to function.  However, from the decisions of the courts, 
no question appears to be beyond scrutiny.  In Mehra v. Union of India, it was 
held that the actions of the B.C.C.I. in the sphere of public law would be subject 
to judicial review.38  However, in B.C.C.I. v. C.A.B., it was held that the  
selection of the national team was a public function.39  Though the SC in Zee 
Telefilms Ltd. refused to answer whether “for entering into a contract with the 
players or for their induction in a team,” Articles 14 and 16 had to be complied 
                                                          
33. Premium Granites v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1994) 1 SCR 579, ¶ 54 (India); Balco Emps. Union 
v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 333, ¶ 46 (India) (quoting Premium Granites, 1 SCR 579, at ¶ 54). 
34. LAW COMM’N OF INDIA, AMENDMENTS TO THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996, 
at 22 (2014), http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/Report246.pdf. 
35. AIR 1994 SC 860, ¶ 66 (India). 
36. LAW COMM’N OF INDIA, supra note 34, at 54–55. 
37. See Subhajit Banerji, Has the Supreme Court’s Recent Judgement Rendered the BCCI’s  
Selection Process More Transparent?, CARAVAN (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.caravanmaga-
zine.in/vantage/supreme-court-recent-judgement-bcci-selection-process-transparent; See also Mehra v. 
Union of India, (2004) DLT 114 (Del. HC) 323, ¶ 14 (India). 
38. Id. at ¶ 15. 
39. Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Cricket Ass’n of Bihar, (2015) 3 SCC 251, ¶ 30 (India). 
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with.40  In light of the decision in B.C.C.I. v. C.A.B., it must be said that at least 
the principles of natural justice must be followed.  At least guidelines that  
appear to be arbitrary or discriminatory on their face, such as that players from 
a particular state or community that are ineligible for selection, may be struck 
down.41  In Kirandeep v. Chandigarh Rowing Ass’n, though it was decided  
before either of the above cases, questions of selection for the Senior National 
Rowing Championship were heard.42  
Thus, the scope of judicial review possessed (or perhaps claimed) by the 
courts is almost unlimited in respect to the public functions exercised by the 
sporting body.  The ordinary relationships of the sporting body governed by 
contract or its internal rules and regulations should remain unaffected,43 though 
this may depend on the nature of the sporting body, as demonstrated in the  
following chapters. 
IV. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MONOPOLISTIC SPORTING BODIES 
AND COMPETING SPORTING BODIES 
In 2008, the Indian Olympic Association (I.O.A.) suspended the Indian 
Hockey Federation (I.H.F.) for corruption on the part of its officials, and  
established an ad hoc committee to run Indian hockey.  A year later, the  
Fédération Internationale de Hockey sur Gazon (International Hockey  
Federation or F.I.H.) threatened to take away the right to host the 2010 Men’s 
Hockey World Cup and the right to participate in international events from India 
over the existence of separate federations for men and women in the country, 
which was contrary to the F.I.H. Statutes.44  Subsequently, the I.O.A.  
established a rival federation called Hockey India (H.I.).  Under the rules of the 
F.I.H., only one sporting body in a country can gain F.I.H. affiliation.45  The 
F.I.H. recognised H.I. and therefore, events organised by the I.H.F. became  
unsanctioned events.  The F.I.H. threatened to ban players who participated in 
the I.H.F.-run World Series Hockey (W.S.H.), jeopardising their chances to  
participate in F.I.H. events, including the World Cup.  The ban was to apply 
prospectively.  The question in such a case, therefore, is whether both bodies 
can be considered to perform public functions and therefore be subject to the 
                                                          
40. Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 2677 (India). 
41. Mehra, (2004) DLT 114 at ¶ 14; Batra v. Union of India, ILR 4 (Del.) 280, ¶ 276. 
42. 2004 AIR (P&H) 278 (India). 
43. E.g., Varma v. Union of India, 2015 KLJ 3 (Kerala HC) 630, ¶ 50 (India); Motin v. Assam 
Cricket Ass’n, 2006 GLT 2 (Gauhati HC) 156, ¶ 17 (India). 
44. See INT’L HOCKEY FED’N: STATUTES art. 2.3(b) (2015), http://www.fih.ch/media/813163/stat-
utes-passed-by-fih-congress-01-11-14.pdf. 
45. Id. at art. 2.1. 
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writ jurisdiction of the courts under Article 226. 
Some of the major reasons for the Zee Telefilms Ltd. court’s finding that the 
B.C.C.I. performed public functions was that it selects the national team and 
exclusively regulates and controls the game of cricket.46  In other words, a  
public functionary is one which controls the national dimension of the sport and 
acts as a gatekeeper to the market for the service of playing sport.  However, 
that is not the case in club sports or in the case of a sporting body that does not 
select the national team.  Section 20(2) of the Draft National Sports  
Development Bill, 2013 provides that there shall be only one National Sports 
Federation for each sport.47  Hence, prior to the recognition of H.I. by the F.I.H., 
the I.H.F. could be said to have exercised public functions (though possibly not 
during the period of its suspension by the I.O.A.), and following the recognition 
of H.I., H.I. can be said to exercise public functions. 
Thus, in the case of competing sports governing bodies, the body which 
selects the national team or receives official recognition from an international 
body such as the I.O.C. may be considered to be the one exercising public  
functions, and when another body gets to select the national team or receives 
exclusive recognition, this status may shift. 
V. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SPORTS GOVERNING BODIES AND 
PRIVATE CLUBS OR LEAGUES 
As mentioned in the previous section, the fact that the B.C.C.I. selected the 
national team was a crucial factor in it being held to be exercising public  
functions.  This is similar to the conclusion reached in the New Zealand case of 
Finnigan v. New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc.,48 where it was held that a 
decision by the Rugby Union “affects the New Zealand community as a whole 
and so relations between the community and those, like the plaintiffs,  
specifically and legally associated with the sport.”49  The court went on to say 
that while the Rugby Union was technically a private and voluntary association, 
as a body assuming national importance, its decisions fell in the intersection 
between private and public law.50  A club, on the other hand, could not be said 
to exercise such functions, no matter its popularity and reach, because it could 
not be said to affect the relations between the community at the national level 
and the persons specifically associated with the sport. 
                                                          
46. Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 2677 (India). 
47. The National Sports Development Bill, 2013, 64th Parliament (India 2013), 
http://yas.nic.in/sites/default/files/File921.pdf (draft). 
48. [1985] 2 NZLR 159 (CA). 
49. Id. at ¶ 4. 
50. Id. at ¶ 5. 
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That is not to say, however, that there can be no legal remedies against  
professional clubs.  Remedies can be pursued against clubs within the rules of 
the governing body, and such decisions made by the governing body are subject 
to judicial review. 
Truly private professional leagues can be distinguished from sports  
governing bodies.  In Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting v. 
Cricket Ass’n of Bengal,51 the SC differentiated between organisers of matches 
with a mandate to promote the sport, like the B.C.C.I. or the Cricket Association 
of Bengal, and business organisations, with the sole intention of maximising 
profits through the telecast of games.52  Though private leagues would find it 
difficult to operate without the oversight or support of the governing body for 
the sport in question, nevertheless, such a body would be akin to a competing 
sporting body and, as shown in the previous section, its decisions would be  
outside the scope of judicial review. 
The Indian Premier League (I.P.L.) is an interesting exception to this rule.  
Being financially sustained by the B.C.C.I. and with its Governing Council, a 
committee under the B.C.C.I., it is essentially a venture of the B.C.C.I., and is 
within the control of the B.C.C.I.  The Operational Rules of the I.P.L. can be 
assailed where there is a potential conflict of interest, as in B.C.C.I. v. C.A.B.53  
Where the clubs are members of the Governing Council, such a process will 
always be vitiated, as per Kraipak v. Union of India.54  This is not the case with 
the I.P.L., but it is with the B.C.C.I.  For instance, disputes between the B.C.C.I. 
and the Himachal Pradesh Cricket Association (H.P.C.A.) would have been  
suspect not long ago, because Mr. Anurag Thakur was then simultaneously 
B.C.C.I. Secretary and H.P.C.A. President.  In respect to the I.P.L., it was sought 
to be argued that a conflict of interest could not arise where an office bearer of 
the B.C.C.I. was also the owner of an I.P.L. franchise because the I.P.L. was a 
purely commercial venture without the public trappings of the B.C.C.I.55   
However, this contention was rejected, and it was held that the B.C.C.I.’s duty 
was to prevent sporting fraud and maintain the public’s faith in the values of the 
sport, which would include conflict of interest situations.56  This shows that the 
public nature of functions apply no matter the format or the formality of the 
event.  This has a serious impact on smaller governing bodies, such as the Am-
ateur Kabaddi Federation of India (Federation), which may be called upon to 
                                                          
51. AIR 1995 SC 1236 (India). 
52. Id. at ¶ 17. 
53. Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Cricket Ass’n of Bihar, (2015) 3 SCC 251, ¶ 81 (India). 
54. (1969) 2 SCC 262 (India). See Mohapatra & Co. v. Orissa, (1984) 4 SCC 103 (India). 
55. Bd. of Control for Cricket in India, (2015) 3 SCC, at ¶ 91. 
56. Id. at ¶¶ 90–92. 
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oversee the Pro Kabaddi League, which was floated and is managed by a private 
company, but which the Federation has sanctioned. 
VI. SOLUTIONS 
The judicial review of the decisions of sporting bodies has the disadvantage 
of the usual delays that accompany the Indian judicial system.  This can be  
observed in cases like Kirandeep v. Chandigarh Rowing Ass’n,57 where, even 
though the courts ruled in favour of the petitioners, the judgement was delivered 
too late for the athletes to receive any real relief.58 
This section therefore discusses two solutions to balance the priorities of 
ensuring fairness in the decisions of sports governing bodies and allowing for 
efficient dispute resolution that meets the needs of sports: the creation of a  
dedicated sports arbitral or judicial tribunal, and the improvement of the existing 
system of judicial review through the evolution or adoption by the courts of 
principles applicable to sporting disputes. 
A. Dedicated Sports Arbitral or Judicial Tribunal 
Sports events require extremely timely delivery of decisions.  When a  
competition is ongoing, a dispute may need to be resolved within a time frame 
of as little as twenty-four hours.  Given the seriousness of the consequences of 
such decisions, such a short time period may not allow for the parties to exercise 
several basic procedural rights, including the right to prepare an adequate  
defence, the right to produce evidence in one’s defence, and the substantial  
realisation of the right to be heard.  Andrew Goldstone has criticised the system 
of ‘provisional suspension’ under the World Anti-Doping Agency (W.A.D.A.) 
Code, under which the athlete who tests positive for doping is first suspended 
and then given a hearing as contrary to the right to a fair hearing.59  A result of 
such a system is that the athlete may be found innocent of a doping offence 
following the hearing, yet he or she loses his or her chance to participate in the 
event or match.  In such types of disputes, the only alternative to provisional 
suspension may be adjudication in under twenty-four hours, which will  
necessitate some sacrifice of the substantial realisation of the right to be heard 
in order for the athlete to be able to get any relief at all. 
The ideal form of dispute resolution mechanism for sports disputes is thus 
                                                          
57. Kirandeep v. Chandigarh Rowing Ass’n, 2004 AIR (P&H) 278 (India). 
58. See Writ Petition, Dhankhar v. Union of India, No. 3914/2014, (Del. HC) (July 3, 2014) (India); 
Writ Petition, Kerala Cycle Polo Ass’n v. Cycle Polo Fed’n of India, No. 186/2014, (Kerala HC) (Feb. 
13, 2015) (India). 
59. Andrew Goldstone, Note, Obstruction of Justice: The Arbitration Process for Anti-doping  
Violations During the Olympic Games, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 361, 370 (2006). 
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arbitration that is reasonably insulated from the interference of the courts.60   
Arbitration is generally considered to be speedier than litigation, and can ensure 
arbitrators having expertise in the field and being sensitive to the requirements 
of the subject matter.61  Moreover, a small pool of specialist arbitrators may 
deliver consistent outcomes while non-specialist judges may not.  Even though 
the process of arbitration excludes the jurisdiction of the courts, it is argued that 
it offers protections similar to those offered by the judicial process.62 
By joining a sporting club or by entering a sports competition, an athlete or 
player consents to the rules of the governing body,63 which may include the 
exclusive jurisdiction of private dispute resolution fora, but it may be argued 
that such consent is illusory in light of the fact that he or she has no choice but 
to do so if he or she wants to participate in the given sporting event.64  In such 
a case, the independence of bodies adjudicating on disciplinary measures  
enacted by sporting bodies becomes very important.  In the case of Gundel v. 
Fédération Équestre Internationale (International Equestrian Federation or 
F.E.I.),65 the Swiss Federal Tribunal, while dismissing Gundel’s appeal against 
the decision of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (C.A.S.), noted that if it had a 
similar action brought in respect of the I.O.C., it would be likely to find that the 
C.A.S. was not sufficiently independent, given the significant control that the 
I.O.C. had over it.66  The C.A.S. was directly funded by the I.O.C. and in smaller 
amounts by international sports federations and had arbitrators appointed to the 
panel by the F.E.I..  Subsequently, however, the I.O.C. created the International 
Council of Arbitration for Sport (I.C.A.S.) to act as an administrative barrier 
between itself and the C.A.S. and diversified the C.A.S.’s sources of funds, 
thereby reducing the I.O.C.’s share of funding.  The IOC also created separate 
divisions for hearing original disputes (generally being of a commercial nature) 
and for hearing appeals from the decisions of federations. 
Dispute resolution mechanisms under the rules of the various governing 
bodies of team sports in India generally do not display a great deal of  
independence.  For instance, the All India Football Federation (A.I.F.F.)  
provides for a Disciplinary Committee,67 whose decision may be appealed  
                                                          
60. See MUDGAL, supra note 22, at 310. 
61. See id. 
62. SIMON GARDINER ET AL., SPORTS LAW 142 (4th ed. 2012). 
63. See Modahl v. British Athletic Fed’n [2001] EWCA (Civ) 1447 (Eng.). 
64. Philip Morris & Gavin Little, Challenging Sports Bodies’ Determinations, 17 CIV. JUST. Q. 
128, 145 (1998). 
65. Tribunal fédérale [ATF] 1993, 119 II 271 (Switz.). 
66. See GARDINER ET AL., supra note 62, at 139. 
67. ALL INDIA FOOTBALL FEDERATION CONSTITUTION arts. 49.1, 50, (2004), https://www.the-
aiff.com/downloaddocumentlibrary.php?id=58 [hereinafter AIFF CONSTITUTION]. 
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before an Appeal Committee.68  Decisions and sanctions of the A.I.F.F. (not 
including suspensions of up to four matches or up to three months) may be  
subjected to arbitration after exhaustion of all previous stages of appeal at the 
club, state association, and A.I.F.F. level.  All the arbitrators are nominated by 
the A.I.F.F. itself, though it provides that they shall be “independent.”69  Though 
the A.I.F.F. Constitution and Disciplinary Code are not clear on this point, the 
fees of arbitrators have been paid by the A.I.F.F. on at least one occasion.70  The 
Memorandum and Rules and Regulations of Hockey India meanwhile provide 
that an Enquiry Committee can be appointed by H.I. itself subject to an appeal 
to its own Executive Board and then to its General Council.71  Similarly, the 
Rules and Regulations of the B.C.C.I. for a Disciplinary Committee of B.C.C.I. 
officials (including the President) makes decisions on the preliminary inquiry 
of a commissioner appointed by the B.C.C.I. President with no appeal.72   
Arbitration is reserved for select disputes relating to elections or between  
members of the B.C.C.I. and the arbitrator, or arbitrators are appointed by the 
B.C.C.I. President himself, or, where the dispute concerns the election of a  
President, by the Working Committee of the B.C.C.I.73  Other disputes have 
been litigated in the courts. 
Fairness and independence in the dispute resolution mechanisms of sports 
governing bodies will help minimise litigation.  The adoption of an arbitral 
mechanism will further decrease judicial oversight, as the courts do not interfere 
with the decisions of arbitrators, and then to set them aside in very limited 
cases.74  Nevertheless, the courts shall and ought to remain as an avenue of last 
resort for ensuring that arbitration processes remain fair and independent, while 
also ensuring they adhere to the principles of natural justice.75 
Justice Mukul Mudgal has stated that there are discrepancies in the  
decisions of internal dispute resolution bodies as well as a need to ensure  
consistency and uniformity in the principles of sports law by following  
precedent.76  The rules and regulations of the concerned sporting bodies  
                                                          
68. Id. at art. 51. 
69. Id. at art. 52.1. 
70. Rahul Bali, The AIFF Hasn’t Followed It’s [sic] Own Constitution – Mohun Bagan, GOAL.COM 
(Sept. 23, 2009), http://www.goal.com/en-india/news/136/india/2009/09/23/1517630/the-aiff-hasnt-
followed-its-own-constitution-mohun-bagan. 
71. HOCKEY INDIA, MEMORANDUM AND RULES AND REGULATIONS OF HOCKEY INDIA art. 18 
(2013), http://hockeyindia.org/images/stories/2012/09/HI-Constitution.pdf. 
72. B.C.C.I. RULES AND REGULATIONS, supra note 24, at r. 32. 
73. Id. at r. 37. 
74. See Arbitration and Conciliation Act, No. 26 § 34(2), Acts of Parliament, 1996 (India). 
75. Morris & Little, supra note 64, at 129. 
76. MUDGAL, supra note 22, at 309. 
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constitute the substantive law governing disputes, but there must be a body of 
substantive law to fall back on when the rules and regulations fail to address an 
issue, or else uniformity and predictability may not be achieved.77  The C.A.S. 
can be said to harmonise global sports law,78 but this will only apply to sports 
governing bodies whose constitutions provide for an ultimate appeal to the 
C.A.S..  Moreover, the C.A.S. arbitration is expensive with its seat in Lausanne, 
Switzerland and the nearest venue to India is in Abu Dhabi, U.A.E.  Hence, 
providing for an appeal to the C.A.S. is unrealistic as a solution.  Domestic 
sports arbitration is necessary which can provide timely dispute resolution while 
offering an adequate level of expertise in the field of sports. 
The Indian Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports first circulated a National 
Sports Development Bill (Bill) for public comment in 2011.  The 2013 version 
of that Bill provides for the creation of a Sports Appellate Tribunal (Tribunal).79  
It is not explicitly stated what disputes the Tribunal shall be empowered to hear, 
but it is specified that they will not include disputes related to doping80 and  
disputes arising during the Olympic Games, Commonwealth Games, or Asian 
Games.81  Moreover, the Bill provides for the transfer of all civil disputes in 
which a National Sports Federation (N.S.F.) or the I.O.A. is a party pending 
before any court or authority (other than a High Court or the SC),82 though this 
would likely not include arbitration.83  Finally, the Bill places a bar on civil 
courts from hearing any dispute over which the Tribunal shall have  
jurisdiction,84 which would include a High Court having original civil  
jurisdiction. 
In light of the negative definition of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under 
the Bill, it is unclear what disputes will actually be heard by the Tribunal, apart 
from appeals from certain decisions of bodies named in the Bill, such as appeals 
from decisions of the Ethics Commission or disputes arising out of accreditation 
                                                          
77. Michael Straubel, Enhancing the Performance of the Doping Court: How the Court of  
Arbitration for Sport Can Do Its Job Better, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1203, 1223 (2005). 
78. Lorenzo Casini, The Making of a Lex Sportiva: The Court of Arbitration for Sport “The  
Provider” 16 (Inst. Int’l Law & Justice, Working Paper No. 2010/5). 
79. The National Sports Development Bill, 2013, 64th Parliament, § 27(1) (India 2013), 
http://yas.nic.in/sites/default/files/File921.pdf (draft). 
80. Id. § 29(b). 
81. Id. § 29(a). 
82. Id. § 31. 
83. S.B.P. & Co. v. Patel Eng’g Ltd., (2005) 8 SCC 618, ¶ 45 (India) (holding that Art. 227 of the 
Constitution, which provides the High Courts with supervisory jurisdiction over all “courts and  
tribunals” within their territorial jurisdiction, could not be invoked against the orders of an arbitral 
tribunal.). 
84. The National Sports Development Bill, 2013, 64th Parliament, § 32 (India 2013), 
http://yas.nic.in/sites/default/files/File921.pdf (draft). 
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of National Sports Federations.85  However, the name of the Tribunal suggests 
that the Tribunal will not have original jurisdiction, and will allow disciplinary 
action against athletes to be taken by the sporting bodies.  This suggests that, 
similar to the existing system of judicial review, the role of the Tribunal would 
be to ensure that the body having original jurisdiction to hear the dispute has 
followed the principles of procedural fairness.  The influence of the creation of 
the Tribunal on the internal appeals and arbitral processes of sporting bodies 
remains unclear.  However, the members of the Tribunal will be appointed by 
the central government on the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India, 
Secretary of the Department of Sports, and the President of the National  
Olympic Committee or his nominee.  This appears to be a body quite  
independent of sporting bodies, and the appointment of regular members should 
create some manner of jurisprudence or precedent to govern sports related  
disputes generally. 
The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Courts would appear to  
foreclose public law remedies against sporting bodies.  However, it has been 
held by the SC on multiple occasions, notably in Chandra Kumar v. Union of 
India, that the writ jurisdiction of the courts cannot be barred by statute.86   
However, the High Courts may be reluctant to exercise their powers in light of 
the existence of the Tribunal.87 
B. Operating Within the Existing System of Judicial Review 
In light of the fact that the Draft National Sports Development Bill, 2013 
has not been passed into law, and the difficulties in creating a pool of arbitrators 
with sufficient expertise to constitute a standing tribunal, possible solutions 
within the existing structure of judicial review must be examined. 
The courts have responded to sports disputes in an ad hoc fashion. Certain 
trends can be observed, even while the decisions of the courts have been passed 
without reference to precedents in sports related disputes.  The courts have  
disapproved of disputes in sports administration being litigated upon,88 and have 
placed the interests of athletes and the sports-viewing public in the efficient  
                                                          
85. Id. §§ 17, 23(2). 
86. (1997) 3 SCC 261 (India). 
87. Id. at ¶ 100.  In Bihar v. Jain Plastics and Chemicals, (2002) 1 SCC 216 (India), the Supreme 
Court held that while the Court has jurisdiction to issue a writ even in matters of contractual breach, 
the existence of an “alternative and equally efficacious remedy” is a good ground for refusing to  
exercise such discretion.  An independent appellate tribunal like the SAT would constitute such an 
alternative efficacious remedy.  On the other hand, the Supreme Court in Wadia v. Board of Trustees, 
Port of Mumbai, (2004) 3 SCC 214 (India), held that judicial review may be permissible where there is 
a public law element involved.  Ultimately, each case must be determined on its facts. 
88. Madhya Pradesh Triathlon Ass’n. v. Indian Triathlon Fed’n, (1996) 11 SCC 593, ¶ 1 (India). 
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running of sports over the formal rights and obligations provided for in the 
agreements entered into by sporting bodies.  In Murugon v. Fencing Ass’n of 
India,89 the SC, rather than sift through the myriad claims in a matter relating to 
allegations of rigged elections, called for fresh elections within two months and 
appointed an observer.90  Similarly, in Indian Hockey Federation v. Union of 
India, in a dispute relating to whether the I.H.F. or H.I. was the recognised body 
for hockey in India, the Delhi High Court provisionally accepted the contention 
of H.I. that it was a purely private body, and allowed elections to be held without 
a government observer while the dispute was being heard.91  The courts have 
also performed a role similar to that of mediators.  In Carvalho v. Union of 
India, the Delhi High Court heard a Public Interest Litigation seeking to permit 
hockey players to participate in the W.S.H. without the risk of being banned.92  
The Delhi High Court, relying on interim orders of the SC recognising H.I. as 
the legitimate authority to select the national team (and therefore to implicitly 
enforce the rules of the F.I.H. and bar players from participating in unsanctioned 
events), nevertheless took note of the fact that the ban imposed operated  
prospectively from a date after a number of players had signed agreements with 
the W.S.H., and allowed the players who had already signed with the W.S.H. to 
participate in it, subject to their availability at national camps.  The justification 
for such a judgement was the interests of players to earn a living.93  It did not 
direct, but rather recommended to H.I. that it persuade the F.I.H., which was 
beyond the jurisdiction of the court, to agree to sanction the W.S.H. so long as 
it did not clash with international events organised by the F.I.H.94 
Hence, though the body of case law is small, it can be seen that some judges 
are sensitive to the requirements of sports dispute resolution.  However, these 
decisions must be seen as precedent and studied by courts hearing sports  
disputes.  Until then, there can be no guarantee for uniformity of decisions. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Sports governing bodies have not been found to be “State” under Article 12 
of the Indian Constitution, but have been made amenable to the writ jurisdiction 
of the High Courts under Article 226.  This is because while they are not  
controlled by the State, they nevertheless exercise public functions by selecting 
a national team and exclusively regulating their respective sports.  The scope of 
                                                          
89. (1991) 1 SCR 658 (India). 
90. Id. at ¶¶ 12–13. 
91. Writ for Petition, No. 4978/2010, (Del. HC) (July 27, 2010) (India). 
92. 2012 DLT 187 (Del.) 524 (India). 
93. Id. at ¶ 23. 
94. Id. at ¶ 30. 
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judicial review is almost boundless; it extends to all public functions carried out 
by the sporting body, including team selection, and has, in B.C.C.I. v. C.A.B., 
included the supplanting of the internal processes of the body.  However, a  
distinction must be made between monopolistic sporting bodies and competing 
sporting bodies, and between sports governing bodies and private clubs and 
leagues.  While the decisions of the former in each case are subject to judicial 
review, the decisions of the latter are unlikely to be. 
The judicial process is slow and may not be suited for the demands of sport.  
Arbitration is the ideal alternative, though the independence of the arbitrators 
must be ensured.  However, there is also a need for uniformity in the decisions 
of sporting bodies, which can be realised through the creation of a standing  
arbitral or judicial tribunal.  However, as the National Sports Development Bill, 
2013, which proposes such a tribunal, not been enacted into law, the existing 
system of judicial review must be improved, with judges being made cognisant 
of the requirements of sport. 
 
